We have outlined the SPAARS model of emotion in detail in Chapter 5, and in the present chapter we endeavour to use the case of anger primarily to illustrate the potential utility of the concept of cycles of appraisal within SPAARS. In passing, however, we would note that part of the general SPAARS model, which is the assumption that anger is one of a limited set of basic emotions, has received some preliminary neuropsychological support from a study of four cases of individuals with impairment of the brain's ventral striatum who have shown specific impairment in their recognition of anger signals (Calder, Keane, Lawrence, & Manes, 2004). Similarly, dopaminergic antagonism, following acute administration of the dopamine D2-class receptor antagonist sulpiride, leads to a highly selective disruption in the recognition of facial expressions of anger, but leaves intact recognition of other emotions and the matching of unfamiliar faces (Lawrence et al., 2002). In conjunction with studies from brain scanning (Blair, Morris, Frith, Perrett, & Dolan, 1999), and from studies of aggression in non-human animals (e.g., Miczek, Fish, de Bold, & de Almeida, 2002), such studies add further support to the proposal that anger has the status of a basic emotion (see Chapter 3).
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